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Abstract 
The study aimed at examining the impact of Internal Audit Function independence on Transparency & 
Accountability. The study adopted independence as the independent variable and transparency & accountability 
as the dependent variable, measured by management perception, organization policy, auditees’ cooperation and 
risk exposure of the organization. Survey data was collected from local authorities in Zimbabwe using semi 
structured questionnaires. Correlation and regression analysis were used to test the hypothesis that the existence 
of an independent internal audit function in an organization is positively associated with transparency and 
accountability. Study findings revealed that the existence of an independent internal audit function in an 
organization is positively associated with transparency and accountability. The findings concur with results from 
previous studies which concluded that an independent internal audit function plays a monitoring role, therefore 
contributing towards promoting good corporate governance practices, supporting the applicability of the Agency 
Theory and the Theory of Inspired Confidence in internal audit research 
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1. Introduction 
Literature on public sector internal audit remains scant (Hutchinson & Zain, 2009; Al-Matari, et al., 2014; 
Roussy & Brivot, 2016), regardless of recent improved attention towards the sector (Neu, et al., 2013; Vinnari & 
Skaebaek, 2014; Everett & Tremblay, 2014; Roussy, 2015) and the profession (Shabnan, et al., 2014; Regoliosi 
& D'eri, 2014; Coetzee & Lubbe, 2014; Trotman & Trotman, 2015; Pizzini, et al., 2015). Though not extensively 
covered in audit literature, the concept of internal audit quality in the public sector is topical, and issues 
surrounding the subject attracts attention of every stakeholder, including the general citizenry (Neu, et al., 2013; 
Roussy & Brivot, 2016), particularly given the enhanced role scope of internal audit and its potential to influence 
corporate governance practices (IIA, 2016). 
The Zimbabwe public sector corporate governance structures and practices are guided by a number of 
statutes, including the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20), Chapter 9. The Public Entities Corporate 
Governance Act (Chapter 10:31), the Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 22:19), and the Urban Councils 
Act (29:15) outlines the role of internal audit, hence the function is deemed important in enhancing public sector 
accountability. Notwithstanding availability of these legal pronouncements supporting internal audit, which 
clearly demonstrates the value of the function in promoting good corporate governance practices, and the 
availability of resident internal audit functions in almost all public sector institutions, stakeholders are concerned 
with increasing reports on the sector’s poor corporate governance practices. These practices involve, but not 
limited to, mismanagement of public funds, fraud and corruption. This moral decay has been blamed for the 
prevailing state of poor service delivery within the public sector (Chatiza, 2008; Mapuwa, 2011; CHRA, 2014).  
With the presence of statutory pronouncements supporting good corporate governance practices and 
resident internal audit functions within respective public sector organizations, these problems are not expected to 
prevail, as they can be avoided through enforced accountability (Erasmus & Coetzee, 2018). As such, the quality 
of Zimbabwe public sector internal audit becomes questionable. In this light, the current study explores how 
internal audit function independence as one of the function’s main quality dimensions (Cohen & Sayag, 2010; 
Mihret, et al., 2010; Abu-Azza, 2012; Al-Shabail & Turki, 2017) impacts transparency and accountability in the 
public sector. Auditor independence can be understood as the capacity and ability of an audit practitioner to 
avoid circumstances that have an objectivity impairment potential (Christopher, et al., 2009), so as to enhance 
unbiased personal judgment (Kimotho, 2014). Independence enhances the ability of an auditor to make honest 
and impartial conclusions. The concept of auditor independence has been taken as the foundation for the audit 
profession, since it is the basis upon which the public derive its trust that the function is capable of effectively 
executing its engagements (Caswell & Allen, 2001; Holt & DeZoort, 2009; Kimotho, 2014).  
Critics against the ability of internal auditors to maintain independence, point to the inevitable nature of 
relationships developing over time (Venasco, 1994), which tend to undermine the capacity for internal auditors 
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to be independent. It is also argued that, since internal auditors are employees of the organization, their behavior 
may easily be influenced by incentives, as established by DeZoort & Reisch (2000), in their study on incentive 
compensation based on company performance (DeZoort, et al., 2001). A related finding by Scheneider (2003) 
established that if incentives are related to the company’s share price, internal auditors are less likely to report 
violations (Schneider, 2003). This also supports conclusions by Vinten (1999), who opined that since internal 
auditors are on payroll of the companies they serve, that alone is enough to establish that their independence 
cannot be guaranteed (Vinten, 1999). However, Schneider (2010) challenged this belief, leading to the 
conclusion that salary compensation is a controversial measure of independence (Schneider, 2010). The 
independence of an internal audit function is dominantly determined by three main factors, thus the reporting 
structure (chain of command) whether the audit function reports directly to the audit committee (Holt & DeZoort, 
2009; Christopher, et al., 2009; Stewart & Subramaniam, 2010). Secondly, whether the audit committee plays a 
leading role in the appointment of the Chief Audit Executive (Christopher, et al., 2009; Stewart & Subramaniam, 
2010), and thirdly whether it is the sole responsibility of the audit committee to evaluate the internal audit 
function’s performance (Jiang, et al., 2014).  
Literature notes that the existence of a healthy working relationship between an internal audit function and 
the audit committee guarantees independence and objectivity (Goodwin & Yeo, 2001; Arena & Azzone, 2009; 
Roussy & Brivot, 2016). Contrary to this conclusion, some scholars argue that when the head of internal audit 
reports directly to the audit committee, there is always potential for unexpected and adverse implications 
(Norman, et al., 2010), this threat to independence was blamed on the need for the chief audit executive to 
safeguard his carrier and reputation, mainly noted in environments where internal audit serve as a training 
ground for future management candidates (Christopher, et al., 2009). The negative implications will be a result 
of the overreaction by audit committee and retaliation by management (Norman, et al., 2010). In the context of 
Zimbabwean public sector, this however has been hedged against as the Public Entities Corporate Governance 
Act (Chapter 10:31) of 2018, section 352, has introduced strict restrictions on the appointment of auditors into 
management positions. With reference to prior studies on internal audit independence and corporate governance, 
a positive relationship between the independence of an internal audit function and its effectiveness in enhancing 
transparency and accountability is expected from this study. 
 
2. Statement of the problem 
Independence in the context of internal audit functions has not received much attention from prior research as 
more attention was centered on external audit (Cohen & Sayag, 2010; Mihret, et al., 2010). Of the few studies 
that focused on internal audit independence and corporate governance, majority of them were in the context of 
developed economies, as compared to their developing counterparts (Hutchinson & Zain, 2009). A handful of 
previous studies concur to the existence of a relationship between internal audit independence and the perceived 
effectiveness of an internal audit function in influencing management decisions within respective organizations 
(Cohen & Sayag, 2010; Abu-Azza, 2012). However, amongst these studies none has focused specifically on how 
internal audit function independence impact public sector transparency and accountability in the context of 
developing nations. More so, some scholars argue on the ambiguity of expecting internal auditors to be 
independent of a management team they serve (Stewart & Subramaniam, 2010; Al-Shabail & Turki, 2017). This 
current study will contribute to existing literature by trying to empirically establish the impact of internal audit 
function independence on enhancing transparency and accountability of the local government sub-sector in the 
context of Zimbabwe, a developing nation. 
 
3. Literature review 
3.1. The Agency Theory 
The Agency theory is a very useful economic theory of accountability, which helps to explain the development 
and importance of audit. An organization is a web of relationships, defined by a nexus of contracts used as a 
means of aligning the diversified individual interests of the parties towards a common goal of maximizing the 
value for the organization (Adams, 1994; Evans, 2003; Ekanayake, 2004). The agency theory points to the 
special relationship that exists between owners of resources within the organization who are the principals and 
those employed to manage such resources for a reward, being the agents (Salehi, 2011). The agency theory 
points to a conflict that emanates from lack of trust between the principal and the agent, which is a result of 
information asymmetry and differences in motives between the two parties. The nature of this relationship has 
defined the development as well as justifying the usefulness and purpose of audit.  
The agency theory has not been widely applied to internal audit research; however, it is a useful basis for 
understanding the need and varying nature of internal audit functions (Adams, 1994). The Internal audit function 
in an organization is meant to reduce agency costs (Yeoh & Jubb, 2001; Kauzya & Balogun, 2005; Sarens & De 
Beelde, 2006), and therefore, the agency theory saves as the framework to explain the existence and scope of 
internal audit functions (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). However, this notion is contrary to findings by Carey 
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et al (2000), whose study established that the existence of an internal audit function is not associated with agency 
variables. Instead, they perceived the monitoring role of internal audit as substituting rather than complementing 
external audit. It can be established however that the study by Carey et al (2000) was centered on a small family 
business setup, and this can be a major limiting factor as the results cannot be generalized across large public 
sector organizations considering the differences in the scope of the study. The agency theory has however been 
used in a number of empirical studies, to explain why some organizations outsource internal audit services 
(Caplan & Kirschenheiter, 2000); to demystify the moral hazards facing management in organizations (Evans, 
2003; Ekanayake, 2004); to define the varying nature of internal audit functions and their relationships with 
management (Van Peursem, 2005); and to justify the relationship between characteristics of an internal audit 
function and firm performance (Al-Matari, et al., 2014). 
Some scholars ague against the use of the agency theory in internal audit literature as they refer to it as 
insufficient in the context of developing economies (Al-Shabail & Turki, 2017), and its applicability in the 
context of public sector organizations, pointing out that the principal cannot be clearly defined in the sense that 
the public may not have a single united interest (Reed, 2002; Mihret, et al., 2010; Al-Shabail & Turki, 2017). 
However, a review of the theory helps significantly towards understanding the position and role of an internal 
audit function within an organization’s governance framework. The Agency theory supports the existence of an 
independent internal audit function as a mechanism that promotes transparency and accountability. The main 
objective of the agency theory is to explain how contracting parties design contracts to minimize the costs 
associated with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Following the ‘complete contract’ theory, 
agency theory assumes that the existence of market and institutional mechanisms can reduce these problems 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
3.2. The Theory of Inspired Confidence 
The theory of inspired confidence which is also referred to as the theory of rational expectations was developed 
by Theodore Limperg during the 1920s (Hayes et al, 2005). It asserts that the need for audit is driven by the 
involvement of external stakeholders in the affairs of the organization. Stakeholders who contribute resources 
towards the existence and survival of the organization demand accountability from those responsible for 
administering the day to day operations of the organization. There is an inherent risk that the information about 
the affairs of the organization availed by management might not honestly present the state of affairs, due to 
possible conflicting interests between management and stakeholders, hence such information should be subjected 
to some independent scrutiny. During such independent check, the auditor should use all the resources at his/her 
disposal to ensure that the expectations of stakeholders are met through the provision of an expected level of 
assurance (Carmichael, 2004). 
The theory of inspired confidence explains the faith that the society has in the ability of the auditor to 
positively impact on reliability of information from management (Limperg institute, 1985), thus fostering quality 
accountability. Limperg describe the auditor’s responsibility as follows; “The auditor-confidential agent derives 
his general function in society from the need for an expert and independent examination and the need for expert 
and independent opinion based on that examination. The function is rooted in the confidence society places in 
the effectiveness of the audit and the opinion of the accountant. This confidence is consequently a condition for 
the existence of that function; if the confidence is betrayed, the function too is destroyed, since it becomes 
useless”. The theory emphasizes on the need for an auditor, when confronted with a situation, to be always on 
the look for societal expectations aroused as a result, and act judiciously to the satisfaction of such expectation in 
order to retain confidence (Carmichael, 2004). Changes in the expectation of society calls for changes in the 
auditors’ role and approach to work, hence this explain the changes in audit function attributes.  
Though not widely used in internal auditing literature, the theory of inspired confidence helps in 
understanding how internal auditors’ practices are impacted by the environment. Internal auditors make use of 
their understanding of social relationships and societal expectations to align their objectives to those of the 
organization. This notion is supported by findings from a survey by Holt &DeZoort (2009), which confirmed 
that external stakeholders’ confidence in company financial statements is determined by their perceived quality 
of the firm’s internal audit function (Holt & DeZoort, 2009).In the context of what stakeholders expect from a 
modern internal audit function and the prevailing corporate governance environment in the Zimbabwean public 
sector, the quality of public sector internal audit functions deserves to be brought to scrutiny. The current state of 
corporate governance in Zimbabwe public institutions, particularly local authorities, and in line with what has 
been concluded by a number of studies (Deloitte, 2010; IIA., 2014; PwC, 2014; GrantThornton, 2015), the 
existence of a consistently widening expectation gap between internal audit and its stakeholders cannot be ruled 
out. The role of independence of internal audit, as a major quality dimension of the function is supported by the 
Theory of Inspired Confidence. An internal audit function should have the capacity to gain trust from 
stakeholders for it to be capable of being perceived as impartial and this is possible through the function proving 
it is independent enough to have the capacity to execute its engagements in an unbiased and impartial manner.   
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3.3. Internal Audit Function Independence 
The importance of internal audit independence has been emphasized by standard setters and well documented in 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. Studies on audit independence pointed 
to the reporting line or the chain of command of the internal audit function (Gramlin, et al., 2004; Archambeault, 
et al., 2008; Prawitt, et al., 2009; Holt & DeZoort, 2009; Christopher, et al., 2009; Stewart & Subramaniam, 
2010), the role of audit committee in the employment of the head of internal audit and the role of the audit 
committee in the evaluation of the internal audit function as being the main factors used to evaluate 
independency of an internal audit function (Messier & Schneider, 1988; Jiang, et al., 2014).   Internal audit 
independence is an important factor in assessing the role of the function on enhancing corporate governance 
practices. It is very easy for an internal audit function to fail in fulfilling its mandate if its independence is being 
threatened by other factors such as conflicting interests (Al-Twaijry, et al., 2003).  
Prior studies on internal audit function effectiveness established a positive association between internal 
audit independence and the function’s effectiveness, hence improved corporate governance (Mihret, et al., 2010; 
Cohen & Sayag, 2010; Abu-Azza, 2012). In a related study, conducted in Australia, Christopher et al, (2009) 
established that independence of internal audit was significantly threatened and hence lack of objectivity. This 
was a result of the appointment of the head of the internal audit function being the sole responsibility of senior 
management as opposed to the audit committee (Christopher, et al., 2009). More so, the fact that some internal 
audit personnel will later be promoted into senior management roles significantly threatening objectivity of the 
sitting individuals who will be perceiving themselves as potential candidates for senior management positions 
(Christopher, et al., 2009; Norman, et al., 2010). This study expects to establish the impact of internal audit 
function independence in promoting transparency and accountability in Zimbabwe local authorities. 
 
3.4. Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe Local Government Sub-sector 
The main structure of the Zimbabwe local government sub-sector includes a ministry, a provincial layer and 
local authorities. The ministry’s function entails leading the development and management of the sector, and 
representing its interests at national and sub-national levels, in relation to other arms of the government. Local 
authorities are the closest to citizens within the local government structure. Currently there are sixty rural and 
thirty-two urban local authorities in Zimbabwe (Chatiza, 2008; CHRA, 2014). Of late, reports of poor corporate 
governance practices have been wide spread in Zimbabwe local authorities. Since the introduction of the multi-
currency system in Zimbabwe in 2009, there have been reports of unprecedented levels of corruption, rent 
seeking tendencies, salary scandals, and other malfeasances that seem to be eating away the moral fabric of the 
Zimbabwean public sector. It is of concern however that these incidences have been taking place 
notwithstanding the presence of resident audit functions within respective local authorities. It is a presumed role 
of internal audit, to bring on board a systematic and discipline approach to evaluate and improve the 
effectiveness of risk management, control and governance, in a bid to help organizations to realize their 
objectives (IIA, 2016). Corporate governance within local authorities is of great concern, considering their 
proximity to the grass roots communities, and also their closest ties with the government, which can make them 
pillars of strength in the fight against poverty. 
Civil society organizations such as residents’ associations have been so influential lately, confronting local 
authorities advocating for improved service delivery and transparent accountability. Civil society organizations 
are organizations that are formed by citizens to pursue their social, political and economic interests (Clayton, et 
al., 2000; Mapuwa, 2011). In 2018, the Zimbabwe government, after being awakened on the decay of corporate 
governance systems in the country’s public sector, went on to legislate public sector corporate governance 
through the promulgation of the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act (10:13), which is in line with 
constitutional requirements. This study is confined in its scope of evidence to the perceptions and beliefs of 
internal auditors and management personnel employed by local authorities in Zimbabwe.  
 
4. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework was developed from a critical analysis of previous studies on internal audit and 
corporate governance. Prior studies reveal that the availability of a resident audit function within an organization 
has a positive implication on performance (Gabrini, 2013). This notion motivates the current study, and therefore 
it hypothesizes that internal audit function independence is positively associated with enhanced transparency and 
accountability. The relationship between the independent variable – internal audit function independence and the 
dependent variable transparency & accountability is illustrated in Fig 1 below; 
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Figure 1. Study Conceptual Framework 
Source: Researcher conceptualization, 2019 
 
4.1. Independent Variable 
4.1.1. Independence 
Independence, as an internal audit function quality dimension will be measured using the internal audit 
practitioners’ views on a series of questions pertaining to the internal audit function’s reporting structure (Holt & 
DeZoort, 2009; Christopher, 2014); Strand Norman et al, 2010), appointment of the chief audit executive and 
internal audit function performance evaluation (Jiang, et al., 2014). The table below summaries measures of the 
independent variable. 
Table 1: Independent Variable Measures 
Variable Measurement Reference 
Independence Reporting Structure Messsier & Schneider, (1998); Abbort, (2007) 
as quotted by Jiang et al (2014); 
Alzeban&Gwilliam, (2012); Christopher, 
(2010) 
Appointment of the chief audit 
executive 
Internal audit function performance 
evaluation 
Source: Researcher, 2019 
The independent variable will be assessed through a questionnaire that will be 5-point Likert-type scaled, 
ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree” or “Always” to “Never” depending on the nature of the 
items for each dimension. Internal audit practitioners (both the chief audit executive and internal audit staff) will 
be asked to indicate their opinions about internal audit independence attributes in their local authorities. 
 
4.2. Measuring Internal Audit Effectiveness in Enhancing Transparency and Accountability 
Internal audit effectiveness in enhancing transparency and accountability for the purpose of this study will be 
assessed through a 5-point Likert-type scale questionnaire on management’s perceptions on specific items about 
internal auditors’ role within their respective local authorities. The questionnaire will also assess the extent to 
which management implement internal audit recommendations. Literature points to the difficulties of measuring 
internal audit effectiveness in upholding governance processes and the absence of a generally agreed approach 
for measurement (Arena & Azzone, 2009; Noble, 2010; Erasmus & Coetzee, 2018). However, as Arena and 
Azzone (2009) pointed out, the use of internal audit recommendation by management as an outcome measure 
(Roussy & Brivot, 2016; Erasmus & Coetzee, 2018) and the level of implementation of internal audit 
recommendations can be used as some of the objective measures of internal audit effectiveness (Sawyer, 1995; 
Van Gansberhe, 2005; Mihret & Yismaw, 2007; Arena & Azzone, 2009). The use and level of application of 
audit recommendation reflects on management support of the internal audit function. Internal audit literature 
points to the criticalness of management support in determining effectiveness of internal audit functions 
(Gramlin, et al., 2004; Sarens & De Beelde, 2006a; Mihret & Yismaw, 2007; Christopher, et al., 2009; Halimah, 
et al., 2009; Cohen & Sayag, 2010).Management perceptions on internal auditor’s role in transparency and 
accountability will be sought in terms of perceived risk exposure and management’s action on internal audit 
recommendations (Cooper, et al., 1994; Arena & Azzone, 2009; Mihret, et al., 2010; Aziz, 2013). 
 
5. Research methodology 
Three sets of data collection instruments were employed as depicted in the table below: 
 
  INDEPENDENT VARIABLE                          DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Transparency & Accountability 
- Management Perception 
- Organisation Policy 
- Auditees Cooperation 
- Risk Exposure 
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Table 2: Data Collection Instruments 
Instrument set  Instrument form Targeted class of respondents 
Instrument set (i) Questionnaire Internal Audit Practitioners(Chief Audit 
Executives and Audit Staff) 
Instrument set (ii) Questionnaire Senior Management 
Instrument set (iii) Document review guide Secondary Data 
Source: Researcher, 2019 
Instrument set (i) is a questionnaire for internal audit personnel. Items are grouped under subheadings to 
assist participants gain easy grasp of questions being asked (Zikmund, 2003). Under the first part, perceptions 
were sought about organization policy, auditees’ cooperation and risk exposure of their respective organizations. 
In the second part, participants were asked about their perception towards their functions’ independence as 
internal audit practitioners. The final part contains questions on the respondents’ profile. Instrument set (ii) is a 
questionnaire for collecting data on the views and perceptions of management on the role of internal audit in 
promoting transparency and accountability. Management’s views can provide a better picture on corporate 
governance and internal audit practices and influences thereof (Cooper, et al., 1994). To this end, this 
questionnaire was aimed at obtaining the views and opinions of senior management on some aspects of internal 
audit practice and its influence on transparency and accountability. Management’s views instead, as opposed to 
those of councilors who happen to be the policy makers were used for the purpose of this study. This is because 
management is responsible for the day to day operations of local authorities.  
Management personnel possess knowledge of several dimensions of corporate governance due to the nature 
of their jobs, and internal audit operations due to their close working relationships with internal auditors. The 
councilors on the other hand represent board members who are appointment based on political merit and not on 
academic or professional competency (Kurebwa, 2015). As such, poor judgment and their lack of knowledge 
concerning corporate governance issues cannot be ruled out. Councilors by nature are not fulltime employees of 
the local authorities, their main role is to provide interface between the local authority and the communities they 
serve, performing policy overview and scrutiny, executive decision making, providing political leadership, 
determining planning implications and community representation. As such, they may lack requisite knowledge 
of internal audit operations. Therefore, the use of management personnel’s views in this study helped in 
generating relevant data which is within the scope of research objectives. Instrument set (iii) is a document 
review checklist that guided the gathering of secondary data from various documentary sources. It specifies the 
documents that were reviewed and objectives of the review. 
 
5.1. Research Hypothesis 
The study hypothesis was formulated on the basis of the need for internal audit practitioners to observe 
independence as emphasized by statutes, corporate governance codes and professional practice requirements of 
the profession, so as to safeguard compromises during audit assignments (IIA, 2016), and to keep the audit 
function on track towards the fulfillment of its objectives (Al-Twaijry, et al., 2003). It therefore aims to establish 
the relationship between internal audit function independence and transparency & accountability. Studies on 
audit independence pointed to the reporting line or the chain of command of the internal audit function, the role 
of audit committee in the employment of the head of internal audit and the role of the audit committee in the 
evaluation of the internal audit function as being the main factors used to evaluate the degree of independence of 
an internal audit function (Messier & Schneider, 1988; Jiang, et al., 2014).   Internal audit independence is an 
important factor in assessing the role of the function on corporate governance practices. It is very easy for the 
internal audit function to fail in fulfilling its mandate if independence is being threatened by other factors such as 
conflicting interests (Al-Twaijry, et al., 2003). In a bid to establish how internal audit function independence 
influences corporate governance practices, as assessed through its influence on transparency and accountability, 
the study hypothesis was stated as: 
H1: The existence of an independent internal audit function in an organization is positively associated 
with transparency and accountability. 
Hypothesis one has other four sub-hypotheses stated here under: 
H1a: The independence of an internal audit function positively influences how management perceives 
internal auditors’ capacity to impact on corporate governance processes. 
H1b: The independence of an internal audit function is positively associated with the existence of an 
organization policy authorizing internal audit. 
H1c: The independence of an internal audit function is positively associated with management cooperation. 
H1d: The existence of an independent internal audit function is positively associated with the extent to 
which an organization is safeguarded against risk exposure. 
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6. Research findings 
6.1. Categorization of respondents  
Table 3 below shows the source of respondents and their percentage representation. A greater representation of 
participants was from Rural District Councils, representing 60.99 % of participants. The level of participation is 
representative as it was relative to the pro-rated distribution of questionnaires. In Zimbabwe there are 92 local 
authorities, categorized in to 60 Rural District Councils (RDCs), 7 City Councils, 8 Municipalities, 13Town 
Councils and 4 Local Boards. As such, the sample of the study is capable of yielding results which are 
representative of the population and therefore findings can be deemed reliable. 
Table 3: Categorization and representation of respondents 
Local Authority Status Respondents Distributed 
City Council 18 (9.89%) 21 (7.78%) 
Municipality 21 (11.54%) 24 (8.89%) 
Town Council 20 (10.99%) 33 (12.22%) 
Local Board 12 (6.59%) 12 (4.44%) 
Rural District Council 111 (60.99%) 180 (66.67%) 
Source: Researcher, 2019 
 
6.2. Reliability and Validity 
The current study used items measured on a Likert scale; therefore, reliability was assessed using Cronbach’s 
Alpha to assess internal consistency. Table 4 below shows the overall Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.837 which is above 
the recommended threshold of 0.7. This generally renders the instrument reliable for the study. 
Table 4:  Reliability Statistics (a) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items N of Items 
0.837 0.867 43 
Source: Researcher, 2019 
Table 5 below indicates Cronbach’s Alpha for individual constructs. Independence as an independent 
construct had a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.835, being above the recommended 0.7. All the other dimensions for 
transparency and accountability had constructs slightly below the recommended 0.7, being Management 
Perception towards internal audit (MP)0.668, Organization Policy authorizing internal audit (OP) 0.651, Auditee 
Corporation (OC) 0.633, and Risk Exposure of the organization (RE) 0.621. Although slightly below the 0.7 
threshold, they are still deemed satisfactory for an exploratory research (Hair, et al., 2010). This therefore reveals 
that all the constructs considered for the purpose of this study are internally consistent, hence reliable. 
Table 5: Reliability Statistics (b) 
Constructs  Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of 
Items 
Management Perception Towards 
Internal Audit 
0.668 0.735 24 
Organizational Policy authorizing 
Internal Audit 
0.651 0.666 4 
Auditee Cooperation 0.633 0.635 3 
Risk Exposure of the organization 0.621 0.66 5 
Independence 0.835 0.818 7 
Source: Researcher, 2019 
 
6.3. Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance 
The Kendall’s coefficient of concordance established that there is a high degree of agreement within responses 
on items explaining management perception towards internal audit and independence, this being significant at 
0.05. However, for organization policy authorizing internal audit and auditees’ cooperation, there was weak 
trend of agreement within responses. 
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Table 6: Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance Table  
Constructs  Kendall's Wa Chi-Square Df Asymp. Sig. 
Management Perspective 0.178 890.708 23 0.00 
Organizational Policy 0.003 2.238 3 0.52 
Auditee Cooperation 0.005 2.006 2 0.37 
Risk Exposure 0.204 177.68 4 0.00 
Independence 0.093 122.224 6 0.00 
Source: Researcher, 2019 
 
6.4. T-test of Mean Differences 
One of the major assumptions tested under the study is that all the constructs are the same, particularly 
determining transparency and accountability, hence the need to prove that they are not depending on each other. 
An assessment of mean differences Table 7, probability values corresponding to t being significant at 0.05shows 
that the assumption does not hold true, therefore, we conclude that the constructs are different so they have to be 
treated differently in the organization, since their influence cannot be the same. 
Table 7:  Assessment of Mean Differences 
Test Value = 0 t Df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Management perspective 178.848 217 0.00 97.87 96.79 98.95 
Organizational policy 129.308 217 0.00 17.65 17.38 17.92 
Auditee Cooperation 127.382 217 0.00 13.29 13.09 13.50 
Risk Exposure 94.9 217 0.00 20.29 19.87 20.72 
Independence 64.697 217 0.00 25.95 25.16 26.74 
Source: Researcher, 2019 
 
6.5. Hypothesis testing  
We test the relationship between independence and transparent & accountability by using the Pearson correlation 
analysis and regression analysis.   We re-state the hypothesis hereunder 
H1: The existence of an independent internal audit function in an organization is negatively associated 
with transparency and accountability. 
We also test the sub-hypotheses re- stated here under 
H1a: The independence of an internal audit function negatively influences how management perceives 
internal auditors’ capacity to impact on corporate governance processes. 
H1b: The independence of an internal audit function is negatively associated with the existence of an 
organization policy authorizing internal audit. 
H1c: The independence of an internal audit function is negatively associated which management 
cooperation. 
H1d: The existence of an independent internal audit function is negatively associated with the extent to 
which an organization is safeguarded against risk exposure. 
 
6.6. Correlation Analysis  
Correlation analysis is performed Table 8 to show the relationship between independence (as independent 
variable) and transparent and accountability as dependent variable measured by management perception towards 
internal audit, organisational policy, auditees cooperation, and risk exposure of the organisation. The results 
indicate that there is a significant positive correlation between independence and management perception of 
0.216. We therefore reject the null sub-hypothesis (H1a: The independence of an internal audit function 
negatively influences how management perceives internal auditors’ capacity to impact corporate governance 
processes), and conclude that the independence of an internal audit function positively influences how 
management perceives internal auditors’ capacity to impact corporate governance practices. 
Correlation analysis between independence and organization policy show that there is a significant positive 
correlation between independence of an internal audit function and organization policy authorizing internal audit 
of 0.167, with a significant level of 0.05. We therefore reject the null sub-hypothesis (H1b: The independence of 
an internal audit function is negatively associated with the existence of an organization policy authorizing 
internal audit), and conclude that the independence of an internal audit function is positively associated with an 
organizational policy authorizing internal audit. Results show that there is a significant positive correlation 
between independence of an internal audit function and auditees cooperation of 0.23. The correlation is 
significant at 0.05. We therefore reject the null sub-hypothesis (H1c: The independence of an internal audit 
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function is negatively associated with the extent to which management cooperates with internal auditors), and 
conclude that the independence of an internal audit function is positively associated with the extent to which 
management cooperates with internal auditors; hence motivating the implementation of audit recommendations. 
Results also show that there is a significant positive correlation between independence of an internal audit 
function and risk exposure of the organization of 0.653, the correlation being significant at 0.05. We therefore 
reject the null sub-hypothesis (H1d: The existence of an independent internal audit function is negatively 
associated with the extent to which an organization is safeguarded against risk exposure), and conclude that the 
existence of an independent internal audit function is positively associated the extent to which an organization is 
safeguarded against risk exposure. We can therefore conclude that the existence of independent internal audit 
functions is positively associated with transparency and accountability in Zimbabwe local authorities (H1), as 
measured by management perception towards internal audit, organisational policy authorising internal audit, 
auditees’ cooperation, and risk exposure of the organisation. 
Table 8: Correlation between Independence and Transparency & Accountability 
Correlations Management 
perspective 
Organizational 
policy 
Auditee 
Cooperation 
Risk 
Exposure 
Independ
ence 
Management 
perspective 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1.00 .428** .391** .419** .216** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Organizational 
policy 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.428** 1.00 .609** .501** .167* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01 
Auditee 
Cooperation 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.391** .609** 1.00 .530** .203** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Risk Exposure Pearson 
Correlation 
.419** .501** .530** 1.00 .653** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Independence Pearson 
Correlation 
.216** .167* .203** .653** 1.00 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Researcher, 2019 
 
6.7. Regression Analysis 
Table 9 below explains the results of the regression analysis that determines the long-term relationship between 
independence and transparency & accountability. The results on table 9 below model 1a show that there is a 
significant positive relationship at 0.05 between independence and how management perceives internal auditors’ 
capacity to influence corporate governance practices in Zimbabwe local authorities; a significant positive 
relationship between independence and organization policy authorizing internal audit. The relationship is 
significant at 0.05. The table also shows the existence of a positive relationship between independence and 
auditees cooperation, and a significant positive relationship between independence and risk exposure of the 
organization, meaning that the greater the degree of internal audit independence, the higher the chances that the 
organization is safeguarded against risks exposure. 
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Table 9: Regression analysis 
Coefficients 
Model  Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1a (Constant) 90.224 2.412  37.403 0 
 Independence 0.295 0.091 0.216 3.25 0.001 
       1b (Constant) 16.174 0.608  26.62 0 
 Independence 0.057 0.023 0.167 2.493 0.013 
       1c (Constant) 11.922 0.461  25.843 0 
 Independence 0.053 0.017 0.203 3.049 0.003 
       1d (Constant) 11.26 0.731  15.399 0 
 Independence 0.348 0.027 0.653 12.669 0 
a Dependent Variable: Management Perspective 
b Dependent Variable: Organizational Policy 
c Dependent Variable: Auditee Cooperation 
d Dependent Variable: Risk Exposure 
Source: Researcher, 2019 
From the regression analyses, we therefore conclude that there is a significant positive relationship between 
independence and transparent and accountability in Zimbabwe local authorities. 
 
7. Discussion 
The Zimbabwean government has been awakened on the importance and criticalness of the country’s state of 
public sector corporate governance, which saw the enactment of the Public Entities Corporate Governance Act 
(Chapter 10:31) in 2018. This follows an outcry by stakeholders on the worrying continuously declining quality 
of service delivery (Mapuwa, 2011; CHRA, 2014). Since this state of affairs was being blamed on poor 
corporate governance practices, this study explores how the poor corporate governance practices could possibly 
be a result of questionable quality attributes of our internal audit functions within public sector organizations, 
whose role among others should be to help organizations improve in governance processes. The study explored 
how internal audit function independence as a major quality dimension for internal audit functions influences 
transparency and accountability in Zimbabwe local authorities.  
The study findings reveal that there is a statistically significant relationship between independence of 
internal audit function and transparency and accountability. The extent to which internal audit can influence 
transparency and accountability was assessed through four different constructs, being management perception 
towards internal audit, organization policy, auditees cooperation and risk exposure of the organization. All these 
constructs show strong correlation and a significant positive relationship with independence. The study results 
concur with existing literature that point to the importance of internal audit function quality in promoting good 
corporate governance (Mihret, et al., 2010; Abu-Azza, 2012). The study findings confirm the applicability of the 
Agency Theory in internal auditing research, confirming that the existence of an independent internal audit 
function can assist improving corporate governance practices, through the elimination of the agency problems, 
supporting conclusions by Al-Twaijry et al 2003. The study results also confirm applicability of the Theory of 
Inspired Confidence as independent internal audit functions are capable of providing an expected level of 
assurance to stakeholders (Carmichael, 2004), by reducing the inherent risk that the information availed by 
management about the affairs of the organization might not honestly represent the state of affairs, this also 
confirms results established by Holt & Dezoort 2009. 
The current study has some scope limitations, as it focused primarily on local authorities in Zimbabwe, thus 
the findings may not perfectly fit for generalization in other public sector players. However, there is no reason 
why we should expect a significant difference considering that the whole Zimbabwe public sector fall under the 
same regulatory environment. The study also has some limitations in the context of measures of the independent 
variable. In line with existing literature, reporting structure, appointment of the chief audit executive and the 
responsibility for performance evaluation of the function are important measures on internal audit function 
independence (Christopher, et al., 2009; Jiang, et al., 2014) these measures were also used in the current study. 
Literature associates internal audit functions reporting to the audit committee, whose performance evaluation is 
the responsibility of the audit committee and the responsibility for appointment of the chief audit executive being 
sorely with the audit committee, as independent enough to conduct their engagements effectively. An interesting 
observation in the context of Zimbabwe local authorities is the composition and operating procedures of audit 
committees.  
In some local authorities in Zimbabwe, management personnel are members of the audit committees. 
Regardless of specific pronouncements in the Urban Councils Act (29:15) Section 97, restricting attendance in 
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audit committee meetings by management and members of the executive committee; in majority of cases the 
executive committee and members of management always attend audit committee meetings. More so, the audit 
committee membership and its chairing are as a matter of policy by elected councilors. These councilors are 
elected into office by virtue of political millage and not academic or professional merit, thus there is no 
minimum or basic academic or professional qualification required for one to contest for election as a councillor 
in Zimbabwe. To quality to be elected as a councillor in Zimbabwe, as provided by Section 28 of the Rural 
District Councils Act (29:13), one only needs to be a resident of Zimbabwe, a registered voter and above 18 
years of age (Kurebwa, 2015), this therefore means that majority of audit committee members have little 
knowledge of either internal audit operations or corporate governance processes, if not illiterate. In usual cases, 
the chief audit executive will be technically the one directing the audit committee. In this light, an investigation 
into other public sector organizations other than local authorities may bring us to a different conclusion. This 
may therefore require a further exploration into how the composition of audit committees and their operating 
procedures in Zimbabwe local authorities affects the execution of their mandates, and how this in turn affects 
corporate governance practices. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The study investigated the impact of independence of internal audit function on transparency and accountability 
in Zimbabwe local government sub-sector. The study established that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the independence of an internal audit function and transparency & accountability. Local authorities in 
Zimbabwe need to emphasize the importance of internal audit independence so as to enhance the level of 
transparency and accountability. The study did not explore ways of strengthening and improving independence 
of internal audit functions, thus the study therefore recommends further research into ways of strengthening 
internal audit function independence in Zimbabwe local authorities.  
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